. 1993 Bringing Back Africa to the Mainstream of the International System -Part 2- in English    

Report on the Conclusions and Recommendations
by a High-level Expert Group on

Chaired by: Lord Callaghan of Cardiff

21-23 January 1993

Cape Town, South Africa

PART II

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

80. In Cape Town, the High-level Group held meetings with a broad range of senior South African politicians in government and from the political parties outside, from business, the churches and from non-governmental organisations (see annex I). These briefings on the present political and economic situation in South Africa gave the High-level Group an appreciation of the speed and the directions in which current developments were heading.

I. THE POLITICAL PROCESS

81. In February 1990, State President F.W. de Klerk had repealed all remaining acts of the Apartheid system. It was however, apparent that whatever may have disappeared from this vast structure, some of the consequences of Apartheid were going to be difficult to dislodge. It denied 80% of the population political and civil rights, impoverished them by design, prohibited black people from owning property and restricted their professional prospects. The South African government should now initiate measures to eliminate all remaining discrimination as quickly as possible.

82. Intensive negotiations between 26 political parties were about to restart. Under discussion were fundamental issues including the arrangements for an interim government and constitution; the drafting of a final constitution; the acceptable form of power-sharing; and the enfranchisement of the majority. The fact that these fundamental matters were being addressed gave rise to considerable optimism. The degree of objectivity, realistic appreciation and mutual understanding with which these difficult matters were presented to the High-level Group was a hopeful experience. The magnitude of the task is enormous indeed following 300 years of colonisation, 90 years of minority domination and 45 years of apartheid.

83. The negotiations seem to move at great speed. It was reported that by March/April 1993 new multiparty talks would be launched that would be broader than the CODESA I and II series which had broken down in 1992. From these it was hoped that understandings would be reached on a transitional mechanism and a date for democratic and properly supervised elections to a constituent assembly later this year or early in 1994. Agreements would have to be incorporated into a "transitional democracy act" to be passed by the existing tricameral parliament. There would be a special provision whereby any amendments to this act during the transition period would require a majority of 80%.

84. The High-level Group was given a sketch of the process likely to emerge: as a first phase and to prepare elections, there would be a transitional executive council on which the main parties would be represented. The second phase would elaborate the unitary, federal or regional nature of the state and its future constitution and would prepare elections to a parliament which will have the powers to appoint the executive and a President. The executive would be a multi-party interim government of national unity. Any party receiving more than five percent of the seats would be entitled to participate in the government. To decide on the constitution, a two-thirds majority would be required. It appeared that the potential for a strong coalition was already forming between two important parties (National Party/NP and African National Congress/ANC) but it was felt important that outlying groups and parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) be kept in play. It was felt that agreement between the parties within a government of national unity would succeed far better than any single party government in tackling problems of internal instability, reassuring minorities and gaining the confidence of foreign governments and external investors.

85. It was clear that at least some of the agreements already reached among 19 political organisations in the context of CODESA, which collapsed in May 1992, would facilitate the constitution-making process: these held forth the vision of South Africa as a united, non-racial country, which would guarantee the freedom and the dignity of the individual; having a new constitution as the basic law from which all other laws would flow; and coming into being as a multi-party democracy with the separation of powers, an independent judiciary and a bill of rights. The separation and interrelationship of powers between the central government and the various regions are among the issues which remain to be addressed.

86. Whatever political form the new South Africa may take, the fundamental principles and practices of democracy must shape and reform its major institutions and structures. It must be a united and democratic country based on a clear separation of powers. Fundamental human rights, enshrined in a justiciable bill of rights should be built into the constitution. Against this background, South Africa must evolve its own frame of political democracy which leaves all groups of society and all regions their own rights and personality.

87. If a settlement is not reached in 1993, the economy will deteriorate further and the frustrations of the people will well up. It was therefore felt urgent to get all parties back to the negotiating table. The understandings already reached between the National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) have to be developed into agreements acceptable to all the major participants in the forthcoming talks. The InterAction Council, therefore, should strongly encourage, the early completion of the current process of negotiations with the full and equal participation of all the parties concerned. NP and ANC need each other if the country is not to become ungovernable; but both need the lnkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of Chief Buthelezi if an agreement is to stick.

II. TOWARDS A CULTURE OF TOLERANCE

88. South Africa has been rocked by vicious cycles of violence. The recent escalation of violence has been largely due to political rivalry, polarisation and mistrust. In an attempt to reduce the level of violence, all parties and the Government signed and put into operation a National Peace Accord in November 1991.

89. Concerned by the already high level of political violence in July 1991, Parliament promulgated a statute setting up a commission to investigate and inquire into the causes of public violence and intimidation with a political aim. The commission was also required to look into the ways and means of curbing the violence and to make recommendations to the State President for policy legislation, the raising of funds, and any measure, which the government might take to curb the violence.

90. Headed by Mr. Justice Goldstone, the five-member Commission began operations in November 1991. Its powers are unique. Persons summoned to give evidence before it are obliged to answer incriminating questions. Any incriminating answer given by a witness may not be used against him or her in subsequent proceedings. The Commission enjoys unlimited powers of search and seizure without any court order. The Commission operates outside the political sphere and does not require ministerial consent to undertake any action. [Following a recommendation from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it should investigate public and private armies too, and that other relevant African countries might be involved, it has moved into these areas too.] The Commission has chosen its interventions carefully and gained the confidence and respect of all sides.

91. The Commission has established a high level of credibility and utility already. The High-level Group is convinced that it is playing a valuable role in defusing public and political violence. It deserves the highest praise.

92. The move towards democracy in South Africa has been stimulated by pressure exercised by the rest of the world. Yet the international community has not always been so vocal about attempts to stifle democracy by the military elsewhere in Africa. If the international community is serious at getting Africa back into the mainstream, it must measure Africa by the same yardstick.

93. One of the most complex tasks for a new South Africa is to foster the emergence of a civil society. The country has never known a culture of tolerance; it must be encouraged and nurtured. People must learn to comprehend that one can disagree and still remain friends. This is not easy in a situation where there are no role-models and where the government has created its own culture of intolerance under which dissenters could not act without fear of being publicly vilified, detained, tortured or killed. The churches will be expected to assume a crucial role of moral beacon and facilitator in the process, and thus continue the effective contribution they have already made to the political process.

III. THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

94. The political transformation process has to be supported by a corresponding transformation and democratisation of the economic and the social landscape. Even if a democratic order is in place, a social structure unable to ensure meaningful economic benefits and improvements in living standards to the disadvantaged will be neither stable or sustainable. The holding of free and fair elections by itself cannot solve all economic and social woes, it only can provide the key to the solution. This poses a serious dilemma: how will a future government be able to meet the expectations of all its electors? The poor in particular may have exaggeratedly high hopes of what democracy can bring. Leaders have now the task of urging their followers to lower expectations and counselling patience. Laws can change virtually overnight and thereby signal hope, but attitudes can be changed only over time while some results demand time, resources and careful management before they can be delivered.

95. For the time being, with attention fixed on political negotiations, the deteriorating state of the economy is not being adequately addressed. The most immediate challenge is thus the formulation of appropriate economic policies and development strategies. For the sake of post-electoral political stability and to enable redistributional policies to begin, it is absolutely, essential that the economy move to a higher growth path. Growth of the order of four or five per cent per annum is needed over the next three years. The South African economy has been in difficulties since the early 1980s. Economic growth has registered a meagre 1.1% The budget deficit for 1992/1993 is at an unsustainable 8%. Over 40% of the population and more than 50% of the black population live below the poverty line. Unemployment stands at 20-25% (six million persons) and is rising. Only some 8% of new entrants to the labour market are being absorbed. 1.3 million families are homeless. In 1993 alone, about 3 million people will have migrated from rural to urban areas because of increased expectations and the consequences of drought, resulting in an unsustainable annual urbanisation rate of 10%. Schooling of black children has been terribly neglected - hundreds of thousands of schools have to be built, an adequate number of teachers trained and books and school materials provided.

96. The economy is suffering from many structural distortions. It has become uncompetitive in the industrialised world. The apartheid regime indulged in wars of destabilisation against its neighbours. From 1970 to 1985, it is estimated that twice the cost of eliminating the housing backlog (40 billion Rands) was spent for military purposes. The response to sanctions was to make the economy inward-oriented and focused on capital-intensive, grossly inefficient import substitution industries, entailing a 40% import protection level. Waste and inefficiency also resulted from the operation of the apartheid system itself: a multiplicity of government departments and the homelands charade all absorbed or diverted scarce funds.

97. There is an urgent need to formulate ·with the help of the international community and international development agencies ·a comprehensive development programme. It must be fully costed with sources of funding identified.

98. Investment is currently estimated to be running at 16% to 17% of GDP, well below the 21% to 25% range which is within the country's potential. Foreign and direct private investment seems to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, but could respond to promising policies on the part of a new government. Owing to official South Africa's recent pariah status, it has an unusually strong informal investment sector. It is estimated than as many as 10,000 non-governmental organisations are now active, and that they channel some 2 billion Rands annually into development projects.

99. Even when the South African economy begins to grow, growth will not be sustainable unless the transformation process is underpinned by the economic empowerment of the black communities. South Africa's economic survival depends on its ability to train and develop its vast reservoir of human resources. Professional and technical skills have to be spread and developed into business acumen. The country is desperately short of entrepreneurship and lacks local skilled technical, managerial and professional manpower.

100. During the transition phase the existing development institutions which originated under apartheid (the Industrial Development Corporation, the Land and Agricultural Bank, the small Business Development Corporation, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the South African Housing Trust and the Independent Development Trust) need to be transformed in order to enhance their capacity and legitimacy and provide for broader popular participation.

101. All these programmes and measures require large amounts of funds. One immediate step must be the examination of the Government budget with a view to identifying possible savings (e.g. through a substantial reduction of military expenditures and a more efficient utilisation of the present education budget) and redirection of resources. Housing is an immediate priority. Whereas comparable developing countries spend between 5% and 9% of their GDP on housing, South Africa would need to raise its spending from 2 bn to 13 bn Rands even to reach the bottom of this range. Other meaningful steps should include a land redistribution scheme to benefit the poor and an undertaking to transfer the titles of publicly-owned houses in townships to their existing tenants. As a side-benefit, the ownership of land and housing would create assets that can serve as collateral for bank loans needed to start small businesses. Better housing and social welfare would reduce those elements in the shocking levels of violence which are caused by the hopelessness and frustration engendered by abject poverty. A redirection of education and health care services must be part of programmes to empower the poor in general and women in particular.

102. Unquestionably, additional resources will be needed: some to address immediate social and economic inequities, others as longer-term investments. Could this take the form and volume of an international supported Marshall Plan? The international community could offer concessionary rates of interests on social welfare-related loans coupled with a substantial IMF loan. The World Bank is standing by ready to fund appropriate development projects and programmes. The EC already has its largest African country aid programme in South Africa, albeit not channelled through government. With an acceptable government in power, trade sanctions will be replaced by appropriate arrangements for access to markets. After 40 years of international pressure and ostracism, it is hardly the time for the world to turn its back on South Africa. The opportunity that will present itself this year deserves the fullest attention by the international community.

103. The new South Africa will be expected to play a positive role in the development of the continent. Resources should be used also for the benefit of neighbouring countries and the instruments of regional cooperation should be deployed in this endeavour. South Africa's transformation will take time; its transition will not be trouble-free. But the hope remains that after decades of economic and political isolation, the liberation of South Africa will henceforth allow an integration of the country's resources into the social and economic fabric of Africa as a whole. Southern Africa's technological and industrial infrastructure, its human resources and its economic potential are capable of lifting the fortunes of the continent.

1. Frederick W. de Klerk, State President of South Africa (with Ministers Magnus Malan, Eli Louw, Gene Louw, Louis Pienaar, Pieter Marais, Derek Keys, G. Morkel and Deputy Minister Renier Schoeman in attendance)

2. Walter Sisulu, Deputy President, African National Congress (ANC) and Kader Asmal, Constitutional Expert, ANC

3. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister, KwaZulu and Chairman, Inkatha Freedom Party

4. Barney Desai, Publicity Secretary, Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

5. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Archbishop of Cape Town, Nobel Laureate

6. Justice Richard J. Goldstone, Judge of Appeal and Chairman, Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation

7. Frank Chikane, Secretary-General, South African Council of Churches

8. Robert Tucker, Attorney; former Director, South African Building Society

9. Colin Eglin, Member of Parliament for Liberal Party; member, CODESA

10. Wiseman Nkhulu, Chairman-designate, Development Bank of South Africa; Chair, Black Management Forum and Independent Development Trust

11. Don Mkhwanazi, Executive Partner, NTS Management & Marketing Renaissance; formerly Chairman, Black Management Forum

12. Jenny de Tolly, Mary Burton and Karin Chubb, The Black Sash

13. Morley Nkosi, Director General, National African Federated Chamber of Commerce & Industry (NAFCOC)

14. Jakes Gerwel, Vice-Chancellor, University of Western Cape

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

A. Members of the InterAction Council

Lord Callaghan of Cardiff (United Kingdom) - Chairman

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo (Portugal)

Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia)

Lopo Fortunato do Nascimento (Angola)

Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria)

B. High-level Participants

Alex Boraine (South Africa), Executive Director, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA)

Karen Brutenz (Russia) - Advisor to the President, The Gorbachev Foundation

Pierre Claver Damiba (Burkina Faso) - Executive Secretary, African Capacity Building Foundation

Francis Deng (Sudan) - former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; currently Brookings Senior Fellow for Africa

Louis Emmerij (Netherlands) - former President, OECD Development Centre; Special Advisor to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank

Marion Graefin Doenhoff (Germany) - Co-Publisher, Die Zeit

Adrian Hewitt (United Kingdom) - Deputy Director, Overseas Development Institute

Mostafa Khalil (Egypt) - former Prime Minister

Colin Legum (United Kingdom) - Correspondent, Third World Reports

Daniel Lisulo (Zambia) - former Prime Minister

Graca Machel (Mozambique) - President, National UNESCO Commission

Robert McNamara (United States of America) - former World Bank President

Nthatho Motlana (South Africa) - Physician; Chairman, Soweto Crisis Committee

Ahmedou Ould Abdallah (Mauritania) - Special Coordinator for Africa and Least Developed Countries, United Nations, New York

Olara Otunnu (Uganda) - President, International Peace Academy

Roy Pitchford (Zimbabwe) - Manager Director, Cluff Resources, Zimbabwe

Barend du Plessis (South Africa) - former Minister of Finance

Ronald W. Roskens (United States of America), President, Action International, Inc.; former Administrator, US Agency for International Development

Fred Sai (Ghana) - President, International Planned Parenthood Federation

Richard Steyn (South Africa) - Editor-in-Chief, The Star, Johannesburg

Tim Thahane (Lesotho) - Secretary and Executive Director, The World Bank

Makoto Watanabe (Japan) - Vice-President, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

C. Secretariat

Hans d'Orville

Dragoljub Najman

Jens Fischer

Terencia Leon-Joseph

***

The meeting of the High-level Group in Cape Town has been made possible, among others, through a generous grant by the Ford Foundation.

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